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THE CONDUCT OF MONETARY POLICY:
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE?*
C O N T E N T S
A. The changes in the macroeconomic and financial environment and their 
implications for policy making
B. The changes in the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy
C. The effects of monetary policy: a re-appraisal
D. How can monetary policy objectives be best accomplished?
E. How should monetary authorities' intentions be presented to the general 
public?
* Text of a lecture given in December 1988, when the author was visiting 
Professor at the European University Institute. For the main, this 
text draws from two recent OECD Working Papers quoted in references:
"The Effects of Monetary Policy on the Real Sector: An Overview of Em­
pirical Evidence for Selected OECD Economies" (by J.C. Chouraqui, M. 
Driscoll and M.O. Strauss-Kahn), and "The Formulation of Monetary Policy: 
A Reassessment in the Light of Recent Experience" (by P. Atkinson and 
J.C. Chouraqui). The views expressed therein reflect, however, the sole 






















































































































































































THE CONDUCT OF MONETARY POLICY:
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE?
The present paper reviews how the role of monetary policy has been 
influenced by i) the important changes that have affected the economic and 
financial environment since the mid-1970s, and ii) by the developments in the 
formulation and implementation of policy during that period. As such, it 
constitutes an attempt to "take stock" of the current state of knowledge about 
the conduct of monetary policy on the basis of recent experience in major 
industrialised countries. Three sets of issues are successively examined:
the changes in the policy-making environment and in the formulation 
of policy (Section A);
the consequences of such changes on the transmission channels (B) 
and macro-economic effects of monetary policy (C);
the choice of an appropriate intermediate target for monetary policy 
(D), and the extent to which the monetary authorities should commit 
themselves publicly to achieving a particular objective (E).
A. The changes in the macroeconomic and financial environment and their
implications for policy making
Since the early 1970s OECD economies have been subjected to large 
supply shocks, to substantial changes in the rate of inflation, to slow 
economic growth, to an upsurge in unemployment, which has remained stubbornly 
high (particularly in Europe), and to increases in budget and external 
imbalances. Moreover, radical adjustments have been experienced in financial 
markets, brought about by the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange 
rate system, the growth of the international banking system and the related 
trends in financial market deregulation and innovation. One effect of this 
has been that domestic financial conditions have become more sensitive to 
monetary policy in other countries.
In such an environment, the optimistic Keynesian consensus of the 1960s 
and early 1970s did not survive; nor did the ways of formulating and
conducting monetary policy practised up to the early 1970s. Accelerating 
inflation raised serious doubts about traditional methods of inflation control 
and created an opening for the sort of alternative analysis being offered by 
monetarists and later by new classical economists. The liberalisation of
financial : markets and the increasing use of market mechanisms encouraged the
search tor alternatives to direct controls on interest rates and the 
availability of credit; the money stock seemed the obvious choice. As a
result, increased emphasis was put on domestic monetary aggregates, which led
to the widespread adoption of target-oriented monetary policies after the 
first oil shock.
Reasons for this shift were generally pragmatic rather than a 
reflection of strong "monetarist" views within central banks (1). One 
consideration was the difficulty of interpreting movements in nominal interest 




























































































inflation. A second consideration was the need to adjust
interest rates more flexibly; monetary targeting provided a framework 
permitting the authorities to make the appropriate adjustments more easily and 
earlier. Third, it was hoped that, by publicising the monetary authorities' 
intentions, announcements of monetary targets would have favourable effects on 
inflation expectations and would provide a yardstick for proving the 
commitment of central banks in controlling inflation. Finally, monetary 
targeting appeared justified, in a number of countries, by the evidence of a 
close relationship between the growth of monetary aggregates and nominal 
income over the medium term —  a factor which heavily influenced the choice of 
particular aggregates to be targeted.
As well as contributing, almost everywhere, to a gradual reduction of 
inflation to rates which prevailed in the 1960s, this approach has provided 
the required flexibility to cope with the external shocks of the 1970s and the 
emergence of large budget deficits. It has also allowed the central banks to 
raise interest rates until they were appropriately restrictive. However, 
problems have emerged in recent years which have considerably complicated the 
conduct of target orientated monetary policies (2). Interest rates and 
exchange rates have, at times, exhibited marked fluctuations which have been 
deemed to be excessive, forcing departures from announced monetary targets. 
Different measures of money have often moved in divergent ways, posing 
problems for the measurement of the stance of monetary policy and the choice 
of monetary aggregate to target. Moreover, the relationship between monetary 
aggregates and nominal income has become unstable in some countries and 
measures of income velocity have been subject to unexpected shifts.
A number of reasons have been advanced for the breakdown in the 
money-income relationship. One popular explanation has been that financial 
innovation and financial market deregulation distorted the monetary aggregates 
by increasing the range of substitutes for assets included in these 
aggregates (3). Another account of this development, known as "Goodhart's 
Law” , is that formerly well-determined and stable relationships disintegrate 
when any attempt is made to exploit them for policy purposes. Viewed from 
this perspective the shift towards a quantitative objective for the money 
supply in the 1970s would have been responsible for the deterioration in money 
demand and velocity behaviour. An alternative explanation is that some of the 
determinants of money demand —  i.e. interest rates and inflation 
expectations -- may have changed sharply and unpredictably as a consequence of 
the successful disinflationary process. On this argument, as gains against 
inflation are consolidated, a stable relationship between money and income 
should reassert itself in the future.
But, whatever the reasons for the instability that has characterised the 
money demand behaviour since the early 1980s, this has led the monetary 
authorities, in countries most seriously affected, to adopt a more pragmatic 
attitude. They have relied increasingly on judgement, taking into account a 
broad range of economic and financial indicators in implementing their policy. 
In so doing, they have felt less constrained to adhere rigidly to previously 
announced targets as circumstances have changed in unforeseen ways. This has 
been the case in most major OECD countries, notably in the United States, 
Germany the United Kingdom and Canada, where the authorities have at times 





























































































In the context of such greater flexibility in the conduct of monetary 
policy, the exchange rate has played an increasing role (A). This has 
reflected attempts to adopt a more coordinated and cooperative approach in 
policy making, as reflected in the Plaza Agreement of September 1985 and the 
Louvre Accord of February 1987. In some countries, the behaviour of the 
exchange rate has been used to provide the authorities with information about 
real and monetary developments. In Japan and Germany, in particular, 
decisions such as i) the choice of the monetary target range, ii) whether to 
aim for the top or the bottom of the range, and iii) whether to allow 
overshooting, have at times been influenced by exchange rate considerations. 
Even in the United States, where the exchange rate has had traditionally less 
of an influence on policy than elsewhere, foreign exchange market developments 
played a role in policy decisions made by monetary authorities in 1978-79, and 
again since 1985.
A number of other countries —  including France, Italy and Canada, and, 
among smaller economies, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden —  have 
implicitly or explicitly made the stabilisation of the exchange rate an 
important objective of their policy. This has largely reflected the exposure 
of these countries to the developments in large neighbouring economies. 
Operationally, such a policy has involved choosing a reference exchange rate, 
usually the currency of the major trading partner (effectively, the 
Deutschemark for the "EMS countries", the U.S. dollar for Canada) or a basket 
of currencies (in the case of Sweden). In practice, this has implied some 
combination of exchange market intervention and adjustment in monetary 
conditions to ensure that the exchange rate objective is met (see below).
B . The changes in the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy
The radical developments in the financial structures and exchange rate 
regime outlined above are widely perceived to have resulted in important 
changes in the channels through which monetary policy operates domestically. 
The reduced reliance on quantitative controls on lending has, in effect, 
increased the role of interest rates in the transmission process of monetary 
policy. The trend towards more deregulated financial markets has meant that 
monetary authorities have had to adopt indirect market-based methods to 
influence the costs of capital, mortgage finance and consumer credit. In so 
doing monetary authorities have come to rely more on open market operations 
and on '’signalling" the direction in which they think market interest rates 
ought to go, for example by adjusting their discount rates and making public 
statements aimed directly at financial markets.
The link between short-term and long-term interest rates has also 
become more decoupled. The increasing use of open market operations by 
central banks and the development of markets for new financial instruments has 
lead to a term structure of interest rates which is now less subject to 
manipulation by the authorities in a number of countries. Vith the removal of 
administrative controls, the authorities action on long-term rates essentially 
depends on conditioning market participants views about future short-term 
rates, which in practice has meant trying to influence the climate of 
expectations about the stance of monetary policy and the implications of this 
for future inflation. This inevitably makes control of long-term interest 




























































































In countries where monetary aggregates are used as important indicators 
of monetary policy, and in which targets are announced for the growth rates of 
these aggregates, the control of money growth relies essentially on money 
market interest rates to achieve a desired change in money demand. The 
tendency for substantial shifts to occur in the portfolio behaviour of the 
private sector as a result of financial innovation has, however, made such 
control difficult. In particular the increasing propensity for components of 
monetary aggregates (especially broad ones) to bear market related interest 
rates has lowered interest elasticities in some countries, making it necessary 
to accept larger changes in short rates. Moreover, exclusive reliance on this 
way of influencing money growth implies that it is no longer possible to have 
separate objectives for the cost of borrowing and the level of liquidity, as 
was possible in the short-run under the former system of direct administrative 
controls on bank lending.
The ability of the monetary authorities to influence market interest 
rates, and thus money growth, has been further complicated by the emergence of 
large swings in exchange rates and the growing international integration of 
financial markets, which has been facilitated by the removal of controls on 
capital flows. The scope, especially in small countries, for sustaining lower 
interest rate levels than those prevailing in the rest of the world may be 
limited, especially if volatile exchange rate movements are unwanted. Also, 
reduced segmentation in asset markets means that it is sometimes difficult to 
exert any independent influence on exchange rates via sterilised intervention 
while pursuing targets for money growth. In these circumstances, independent 
monetary and exchange rate targets cannot be pursued simultaneously.
In addition to being a possible constraint on changes in domestic 
financial conditions, the exchange rate is a potentially important channel 
through which monetary policy influences the real sector. Exchange rate 
adjustments have important effects on the relative prices of domestic and 
foreign goods, so that, apart from influencing trade flows, they condition 
domestic costs and prices through their impact on import prices. Moreover, 
given the importance of foreign asset holdings in domestic portfolios in some 
countries, by directly affecting the price of foreign assets in terms of the 
domestic currency, exchange rate movements are a potential avenue for 
significant wealth effects.
C. The effects of monetary policy: a re-appraisal
In a recent study published in 1988 (5), the OECD Secretariat examined 
how the macroeconomic influence of monetary policy has changed since the 
mid-'seventies as a result of the developments described above. The point of 
departure for this research was a similar work undertaken a decade ago by the 
OECD which was published in 1975 under the title "The Role of 
Monetary Policy in Demand Management (6). In what follows, the conclusions of 
these two surveys are briefly summarised to illustrate how the state of 
understanding about the effects of monetary policy on real sector variables 
has developed over time.
1. The 1975 OECD study




























































































the 1960s and early 1970s, focused mainly on the effects of monetary 
policy on the components of real GDP and on aggregate nominal income. Typical 
of the consensus that prevailed at the time, the study saw the role of 
monetary policy in determining these macroeconomic variables as being 
substantial; monetary policy was seen not only as an important source of 
variation in aggregate demand but also as a useful tool, for short-run 
stabilisation purposes. The rationale for this view was stated concisely and 
clearly as follows (page 9):
"In most countries the main source of cyclical instability has 
been observed in private investment and the demand for 
consumer durables. These expenditures are to a considerable 
extent financed by borrowing. A priori, it would appear that 
monetary policy has natural advantages as a tool of economic 
stabilisation; by varying interest rates and flows of credit 
at an early enough stage, the authorities could apparently 
achieve a smoothing of total demand desired".
The existing empirical evidence was interpreted as supporting this position; 
for example, it was said that:
"... the short-run effects seem on the whole strong enough to 
leave an important role for discretionary policy ... monetary 
policy clearly retains an important short-run role."
Such statements reveal much about prevailing views on the effects and 
transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. Aggregate supply was taken to be 
demand determined and aggregate demand was, in turn, seen to depend, though 
not exclusively, on the stance of monetary policy. At any time the stance of 
policy itself was measured by the level of the nominal rate of interest or the 
degree of credit rationing -- channels through which the effects of monetary 
policy were supposed to be transmitted to the real sector. These effects were 
not viewed as being instantaneous, but the lags involved were estimated to be 
sufficiently short to provide the rationale for an effective discretionary 
stabilisation role for monetary policy.
This rather optimistic assessment of the scope for monetary policy was 
not, however, unqualified. A number of features of the late 1960s and early 
1970s wejre identified in the 1975 study as limiting the relevance of the 
accepted conceptual framework. Among the most important of these was the 
increasing openness of economies, as reflected in the rapid development of 
international financial transactions, the pressure for less regulated and more 
competitive domestic financial markets, the acceleration of inflation and 
rising unemployment. The external position was also found to be of particular 
significarvce in a number of countries and the role of international capital 
flows was acknowledged to be gaining a growing importance despite attempts to 
neutralise their effects.
2. The 1988 OECD study
Like the 1975 survey, this study also deals essentially with what 
monetary policy does: that is how it influences the evolution of the price
level, output and employment. The analysis takes place both at the conceptual 




























































































(the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and 
Canada) and three selected open economies (Australia, the Netherlands and 
Sweden). However, it is not confined to an examination of the effects of 
monetary policy on the domestic economy, as was the case with the 1975 study, 
but also considers the topical issue of international monetary interdependence 
and coordination.
Vhat are the main conclusions of this new research? A first and 
important one is that measurement of the effects of monetary policy on the 
real sector of the economy is complicated by the lack of a universally 
accepted analytical framework. The evidence on models which combined market 
clearing and rational expectations is, on the whole, considered as less 
relevant in current circumstances than that based on models assuming slow 
price adjustment. Market clearing and rational expectations have indeed 
little or no empirical foundation, the weight of evidence providing more 
support for a macroeconomic framework in which prices adjust gradually. 
Furthermore, monetary shocks (defined as unanticipated changes in money 
growth) do not appear to be wholly responsible for the business cycle; real 
as opposed to monetary factors may have a more important role to play in 
generating business cycles.
However, the study recognises that if the structural reforms that many 
governments have implemented succeed in increasing the competitiveness and 
flexibility of markets, including the labour market, the market clearings 
framework might emerge as a closer approximation of reality than the currently 
more orthodox sticky-price approach, at least over the medium term. In fact, 
the introduction of such a framework into the debate on monetary policy has 
already had some important effects. In particular, it has focused attention 
on the evolution of the equilibrium in the economy and raised questions about 
how this might be influenced by monetary policy. It has also highlighted the 
potentially important role of expectations in the transmission process of 
monetary policy. Finally, it has mostly been within this framework that the 
damaging effects of instability in monetary policy on output and employment 
have been analysed. Therefore, although the sticky price model still remains 
the main tool of monetary policy analysis, there may be much to be gained from 
paying more attention to equilibrium properties of economies, the role of 
expectations and the effects of monetary policy instability —  areas not yet 
well understood.
Another conclusion of the 1988 study is that the evidence on the real 
sector effects of monetary policy, based mainly on large-scale models, which 
are in the spirit of the non-clearing markets framework, does not generally 
support the view that the price level or output can be closely controlled in 
thè short run. The diversity in the size of the reported multipliers and the 
widely varying structure of the models, the parameters of which are often 
subject ,to large revisions, means that the short-run response of real sector 
variables to changes in financial conditions cannot be known with any degree 
of confidence. As regards output, the empirical evidence presented in the 
study tends to suggest that the effects of monetary policy are uncertain, both 
in terms of their initial impact and in terms of their duration. As for 
inflation, it appears that, among the countries considered, typically no 
strong and reliable short-run relationships exist between money growth and 
inflation. However, generalJy, those OECD countries with higher average rates 




























































































medium- to long-term relationship. This suggests that sustained changes in 
the rate of money growth will have a lasting effect on the rate of inflation.
In addition to the diversity of empirical results on the macroeconomic 
effects of monetary policy reported in the study, there are other reasons why 
policymakers would be justified in feeling uncertain about the outcomes of 
their actions. Uppermost is the perception that the structure of the economy 
is subject to change: casual observation of time series reveals substantial
shifts in such variables as savings ratios, money velocity, etc., over the 
last decade or so. The changing economic and financial environment is likely 
to have played an important role in this respect. Another consideration is 
that, in the present more deregulated financial market context, the
relationships between macroeconomic variables are likely to depend, to an 
important extent, on market sentiment and expectations. This perception has 
been underlined by the overriding weight now given by commentators and central 
banks to the importance of market "confidence" —  a factor which is seen as 
likely to swamp the traditional wealth effects of financial asset price 
changes. This means that the effects of adjustments in particular policy 
instruments may differ depending on whether market participants anticipate 
these adjustments or not, and whether they expect policy changes to be 
permanent or only temporary. Consequently, in assessing the effects of
monetary policy, it is important to take into account the conditions 
notably the state of expectations —  in which it is being conducted and the 
effects that monetary policy might have on these conditions.
This suggests that attempts to use monetary policy for "fine tuning" 
economic activity runs the risk of having perverse effects on price and output 
developments. By creating uncertainty about the general direction of policy, 
such active short-run monetary policy may also destabilise private sector 
expectations. However, it does not mean that monetary authorities should not 
react at all to events. Monetary policy has to be aimed at sustaining the 
integrity of the financial system and of preventing "excessive volatility" in 
financial markets, which may have adverse effects on investor and consumer 
confidence. In this context it was clearly appropriate for central banks to 
provide liquidity to financial systems after the October 1987 stock market 
crash, as well as to intervene in foreign exchange markets to bring about an 
orderly adjustment in exchange rates from the autumn of 1985. The pursuit of 
such market stabilisation should, however, involve no more than temporary 
operations until policies can be put in place which deal with the fundamental 
cause of financial disturbances.
There is in fact nothing in the empirical evidence shown in the study 
that would suggest that, in order to preserve price stability, monetary 
authorities should abandon the medium-term approach to policy that has been 
practised in OECD countries in the 1980s. In particular, monetary policy 
should not be designed to take on the prime responsibility for correcting the 
cyclical instability of output and employment; it should rather be orientated 
towards the less ambitious objective of price stability over the medium term. 
Indeed, the provision of a stable nominal framework, on which the private 
sector can rely in forming expectations, is perhaps the best contribution that 
monetary policy can make to limiting costly adjustments in economic activity.
However, the task of conducting monetary policy in that way may not be 




























































































measurement of the stance of policy means that monetary authorities currently 
need to be pragmatic and to monitor all potentially informative 
variables (including real sector variables). This pragmatism implies some 
flexibility both in pursuing intermediate monetary targets and in the setting 
of monetary instruments. If such short-run flexibility is to be effective it, 
nevertheless, remains crucial for monetary authorities to maintain public 
confidence in the credibility of their medium-term goal of price stability. 
Indeed, other things being equal, monetary policy effects are likely to be 
most predictable in an environment where the authorities are able to convince 
market participants that they are pursuing a credible medium-term strategy 
which they fully intend to stick to. How can this be achieved? This is the 
object of the section below.,
D . How can monetary policy objectives be best accomplished?
Once a judgement has been made about the desirable evolution of 
inflation and nominal magnitudes more generally, it is necessary to find a way 
to conduct policy in order to achieve these objectives. Given that central 
banks cannot control spending or price formation directly, it is useful to 
have an intermediate target which offers a clear set of guideposts around 
which policy can be formulated over the medium term.
Two approaches, interest rates and real exchange rate targeting, are 
usually regarded as unsatisfactory for this purpose, as neither of these 
offers an anchor which monetary policy can stick to in an attempt to prevent 
unlimited cumulative divergences of the price level from a non-inflationary 
path (7). It is generally difficult for monetary authorities to identify what 
is the appropriate real or nominal interest rate level consistent with 
non-inflationary policies. Since interest rates are affected by fiscal 
policy, as well as by exogenous domestic and international developments, their 
movements are not easily predictable. Furthermore, attempts to keep interest 
rates at relatively low levels may entail an acceleration of monetary growth 
and eventually the loss of control over inflation. Thus, while interest rates 
may be useful as operating instruments to assist the achievement of 
intermediate targets in terms of money or credit aggregates or exchange rates, 
they cannot, themselves, offer a viable basis for policy formulation over the 
medium term. Similarly, there is no uniquely appropriate real exchange rate, 
and, even if there were, a policy of fixing it, as under a crawling peg 
arrangement, would imply automatic accommodation of domestic inflationary 
disturbances.
If monetary policy is to be successful, it must therefore be conducted 
in such a way that inflationary pressures will be resisted. Three approaches 
merit consideration in this respect (i) retention of monetary targets; 
(ii) adoption of nominal income targets; and (iii) stabilisation of the 
nominal exchange rate, i.e. a "hard currency" option.
1. Retaining the monetary targeting approach
Notwithstanding the difficulties experienced in a number of countries 
with monetary targeting, a retention of this approach, perhaps in a modified 
form, may still appear useful if it is possible to identify an appropriate 
money aggregate displaying a stable relationship, in the sense of being 




























































































that, as indicated above, financial innovations and deregulation have tended 
to "distort" the aggregates by changing the at tractiveness and "moneyness" of 
previously existing assets, both relative to each other and to new assets as 
they become available (8). In principle, this problem can be addressed by 
periodically altering the definitions to include new types of financial assets 
in the appropriate aggregates and to adjust the statistical treatment of 
existing assets where their characteristics have changed. However, if the 
financial environment were changing too rapidly the frequency of changes in 
definition that would be required would be too high to make the effort useful.
An alternative way to deal with this problem, within the monetary 
targeting framework, would be to focus on divisia monetary aggregates. These 
are essentially index numbers which weight various monetary and quasi-monetary 
assets according to their degree of liquidity. The weights depend upon the 
shares of the assets in the total and upon their relative opportunity costs, 
which, in practice, are measured as the difference between the rates of return 
on these assets and the maximum available market return. Advocates of giving 
divisia monetary indices an important role in policy formulation argue that 
much of the variability of income velocity and instability in the demand for 
money —  a feature of relationships involving conventional monetary 
aggregates —  is eliminated when the divisia counterparts of these aggregates 
are used instead.
Some empirical evidence has been provided to support the view that 
divisia aggregates are superior to conventional ones (9), but a number of 
studies have come to the opposite conclusion (10), so that there is no clear 
empirical case in their favour in terms of the behaviour of money demand and 
velocity. Moreover, divisia monetary aggregates have a number of
drawbacks (11). The reaction of markets to the framing of monetary targets in 
terms of a composite index is uncertain, and it might prove difficult to 
establish confidence in such an indicator, which has a much less obvious 
interpretation than conventional aggregates. In addition, control of divisia 
monetary aggregates would be subject to the same difficulties as those met in 
controlling conventional ones. Finally, the weights used in the divisia index 
are not independent of the quantities of the assets considered. If, for 
example, the monetary authorities attempted to reduce the growth of the 
divisia aggregate by restricting the supply of cash, the return on financial 
assets would rise. This would increase the weight given to cash in the index 
and alter the weights attached to the other assets. Therefore, control of a 
divisia index would require that the weights of the components be predictable.
A third possibility in the context of an aggregates-oriented approach 
would be to consider an aggregate in terms of "monetary base" i.e. consisting 
essentially of notes in circulation and bank reserves, which represent
liabilities of the monetary authorities. From a purely technical viewpoint
there may appear to be advantages in focusing on an aggregate that consists 
solely of central bank money, as the monetary authorities should normally be 
in a position to control their own balance sheets. Furthermore, at least some 
of the shifts in private portfolios and changes in financial behaviour, which 
arise as a consequence of innovation, would be unlikely to affect or distort 
an aggregate consisting entirely of base money. However, a policy of 
restricting the supply of central bank money, in the face of an increase in 
the public's demand for notes, would run the risk of draining the banking




























































































constrain the central bank to provide additional cash, in order to avoid too 
large fluctuations in short-term interest rates, but at the risk of 
undermining the effectiveness of the policy. To avoid these problems the 
central bank can operate indirectly with money market management primarily 
designed to restrain the growth of broader aggregates and/or spending 
intentions, and hence the demand for bank notes, in order to achieve the 
targets. (This was the case, for example, with the control of central bank 
money in Germany.) In so doing, however, monetary policies are subject to the 
same difficulties as those affecting broader aggregates.
2. Nominal income targeting
An alternative to controlling monetary aggregates that has raised 
increasing interest in recent years is nominal income targeting (12). The 
nominal income approach has several attractions. At the strategic level, it 
would make it more transparent to the public that while the authorities assume 
responsibility for the medium-term growth of nominal magnitudes, the split 
between prices and output depends on the behaviour of the private sector. It 
therefore offers a clear incentive to moderation in wage and price formation 
in order to make room for more real output. At the operational level, if 
money velocity is predictable, the nominal income target can be regarded as a 
velocity-adjusted monetary target. However, nominal income targeting is in 
some sense more general than monetary targeting as it allows the authorities 
to bring more information to bear on the conduct of monetary policy. In 
particular, it gives the authorities the possibility of responding to
disturbances which influence money velocity in unforeseen ways by offsetting 
adjustments in policy. Moreover, it provides an overall framework
encompassing instruments other than monetary policies, and remains applicable 
regardless of the short-run stability of the demand for money or the relative 
effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policies in influencing demand.
There are, however, some clear operational problems associated with the 
nominal income targeting approach. Perhaps the most serious is that nominal 
income is not a variable that the monetary authorities themselves are in a 
position to control, at least within a year, which is the normal projection 
period for monetary targets. If it showed signs of deviating from the target
during the projection period, it would be very difficult to engineer a
correction. As stressed above, the way the economy responds to monetary 
variables is not sufficiently well understood, and the lag structure of these 
responses^ is too uncertain, to allow any confidence that short-run adjustments 
would be successful.
Another difficulty is that the non-accommodating nature of a nominal 
income target implies that policy should respond to a disturbance affecting 
prices with a view toward causing a one-for-one offsetting movement in output.
As the mcfney-income relationship, even where it is stable, has some elasticity
during the short run, a monetary target would not normally have this effect. 
The nominal income approach could be therefore comparatively destabilising 
with respect to output in the face of price disturbances, if attempts were 
made to implement it over periods as short as a year. Formulation of targets 
in terms of ranges would possibly ease this problem somewhat, as the 
authorities could, in principle, aim for the lower or upper ends of the ranges 
in this circumstance. However, this is also true of monetary targets, so the 





























































































Finally, the statistical base for nominal income targeting is not very 
satisfactory. While monetary data are available quickly and are rarely 
revised to a significant extent, apart from the seasonal adjustment, national 
accounts data are generally available only after a lag of several months and 
are subject to considerable subsequent revision.
3. Nominal exchange rate targeting
The nominal exchange rate offers an alternative intermediate target 
which is currently used by a number of countries, mainly smaller ones (13). 
Choosing this approach and adhering to it implies that the objectives 
concerning the desirable evolution of domestic inflation over longer periods 
are similar to those formulated abroad, since nominal magnitudes, and hence 
inflation, are forced to adjust to foreign ones. Operationally it involves 
choosing a reference exchange rate, usually the currency of a major trading 
partner or a basket of currencies, and some combination of exchange market 
intervention and adjustment of monetary conditions to influence capital flows 
to ensure that the target is met.
Generally, the achievement of a nominal exchange rate target is more 
straightforward than is often the case with monetary targets. A policy of 
intervention in the exchange market, if not sterilised, quickly affects 
short-term interest rates and leads, in principle, to equilibrating capital 
flows which allow the exchange rate to be maintained. Whatever the precise 
operating procedure, however, a policy of allowing rapid and substantial 
movements in money market rates should normally make nominal exchange rate 
targeting viable in a technical sense without necessitating unsustainable 
movements in official reserves.
There are a number of positive aspects of a policy formulated in terms 
of stabilising the nominal exchange rate:
i) If inflation is low in the reference currency country, pegging the 
exchange rate to it will contribute to restraining price increases.
ii) The exchange rate is an instantly observable market price whose 
meaning is clear to everyone; if policy is successful in
stabilising it, its behaviour will not be subject to the problems 
of interpretation which often arise with monetary targets.
kiii) If the rate of inflation has converged toward that achieved in the 
reference currency country, and the parity is appropriately 
chosen, a policy of nominal exchange rate stabilisation should 
limit the extent of real exchange rate misalignment and associated 
resource misallocation.
On the other hand, adhering to a nominal exchange rate target may have 
potential disadvantages. First, it ultimately implies abdication of control 
over domestic monetary conditions in favour of adjusting to foreign ones. To 
the extent, however, that it is difficult to find reliable relationships 
between domestic monetary variables and economic performance this may not be a 
problem, and if monetary policies in the country responsible for the reference 
currency are steady and non-inflationary it may even be a welcome feature. 




























































































the sovereignty of national policies and implies domestic monetary 
adjustment to both external shocks and policy changes (either inflationary or 
deflationary) taking place abroad. Second, because a fixed nominal exchange 
rate ultimately involves acceptance of the endogeneity of money and credit 
conditions, inflation control must rely heavily on the direct effects of 
international cost competitiveness and price arbitrage in tradeable goods
markets. In those countries where international trade accounts for a 
relatively small share in activity, this can be a comparatively weak 
restraining force, while the loss of control of the domestic money supply 
would imply risks of both inappropriate overall levels of aggregate demand and 
accommodation of undesirable wage and price behaviour. Third, it is not
possible for all countries simultaneously to rely on a fixed exchange rate to 
determine their monetary policies. At least one country, or a group of 
countries whose currencies play a dominant role, must have an important 
responsibility in determining the rate of inflation in the system as a whole.
E. How should monetary authorities' intentions be presented to the general
public?
Another important aspect of policy formulation in the present context 
concerns the way monetary authorities can make their intentions known to the 
public and, in particular, whether they should commit themselves openly and 
explicitly to achieving specific goals. While the widespread decline in 
inflation in the 1980s, and gradual adjustment of market expectations in this 
regard, may have reduced the necessity to influence the public's behaviour in 
order to minimise output losses, monetary authorities cannot afford to neglect 
the effects of their actions on inflation expectations. Indeed, a worsening 
of expectations would threaten much of the progress that has been made in 
recent years toward establishing an environment conducive to non-inflationary 
growth. Moreover, changes in expectations can have important effects on 
financial markets, and, in particular, can exacerbate the problem of exchange 
rate instability.
The strongest attitude the monetary authorities can take vis-à-vis the 
public is to commit themselves to the achievement of an announced target. 
This would make clear what they intend to do and would provide an objective 
way to hold them accountable, which implies that the target to be achieved 
must in fact be something for which they are in a position to accept 
responsibility. In this regard a formal target for nominal income would pose 
serious problems. Since nominal income cannot be controlled over shorter 
periods such as a year, the monetary authorities will normally be reluctant to 
make commitments of this type. Furthermore, among the factors which influence 
the behaviour of nominal income in the short run, fiscal policy plays an 
important role. While, as noted above, one of the advantages of the nominal 
income approach is to encompass the effects of policies generally rather than 
those of* monetary policy alone, it would blur the role of the monetary 
authorities. Central banks which have traditionally had a high degree of 
independence might find this threatened if they were forced to share 
responsibility with the government for a target which they cannot achieve on 
their own.
In contrast, targets expressed in terms of monetary aggregates or 
exchange rates offer clear statements of the contributions which central banks 




























































































advantages of (i) providing scope for adjusting interest rates in a timely way 
and (ii) allowing the authorities to resist political pressures 
for excessively easy policies. Furthermore, if the targets are regarded by 
the public as meaningful, in the sense that their achievement would have 
implications for inflation, and if the authorities' commitments to achieving 
them are credible, the effect on private sector expectations is likely to be 
favourable. As recent experience has shown, however, there are potential
disadvantages associated with public commitments to achieve announced targets 
for money variables. First, they may limit the authorities' freedom in the 
short-run conduct of policy in undesirable ways. There is, of course, some 
scope for building in some flexibility by expressing targets in terms of 
ranges rather than points, but once the limits of the ranges are reached the 
problem is fundamentally the same. Second, a high priority would have to be 
attached to the achievement of the target, which implies confidence in the 
targeted intermediate variable. Where financial innovation is considered to 
be a problem, or where exchange rate movements would quickly lead to 
reconsideration of policy, central banks would probably avoid committing
themselves strongly to monetary targets they might be forced to abandon.
A more flexible approach would be for the monetary authorities to 
announce targets but to make them conditional on certain other
developments (1A ). Monetary targets subject to certain caveats about exchange
rate behaviour or nominal income developments fall into this category. An
important issue here is the severity and explicitness of the conditions. If 
these are constraining and clearly stated, conditional targets boil down to 
complicated versions of simple targets. They do, however, allow for some 
flexibility in the face of unforeseen developments. If the conditions are 
weak, or vaguely stated, conditional targets essentially commit the 
authorities to very little. This has the advantage of allowing them to 
exercise more flexibility in the conduct of policy, but at the cost of 
undermining any favourable effects on expectations which could be expected 
from a persistent achievement of announced targets.
A final possibility is for central banks to preserve their room for 
manoeuvre by not making any public statements about the future evolution of 
intermediate variables. This would essentially involve foregoing the 
advantages of influencing expectations that are associated with the clear and 
credible announcements of targets. However, where inflation has been reduced 
to rates that would be appropriate over the medium term and the central bank's 
credibility is well established, the costs of sacrificing such advantages may 
be minimal. On the other hand, they could be substantial if the decision not 
to announce targets is perceived as reflecting a central bank's bias toward 
laxity.
In practice it may prove difficult for monetary authorities to avoid 
giving sdme form of explicit public indication of their policy intentions in 
terms of an intermediate target. Historically this has been the norm: until
the early 1970s the fixed exchange rate system placed a well-understood 
constraint on policies and the move toward monetary targeting followed soon 
after the shift to floating. To dispense for a long period with any public 
formulation of policy intentions in terms of intermediate targets would 
represent, therefore, an entirely new posture. While it may be convenient 
for a central bank to preserve its options, even if it in fact adheres fairly 




























































































are limits to this approach. Lack of information about the monetary 
authorities' intentions could be damaging if it caused uncertainty in the 
private sector and, consequently, resource misallocation. Furthermore, the 
government and the public will inevitably wish to be able to hold the central 
bank accountable for its actions, and to have benchmarks by which the success 
of these actions can be measured.
Thus, to conclude, by formulating their policies in terms of an 
intermediate target central banks can increase the likelihood that they will 
be held responsible for developments they are in a strong position to control. 
The alternative may be that, in the public's mind, they are held accountable 
for developments they are either poorly placed to influence or cannot 





























































































1. The main motivations for the adoption of monetary targets are discussed 
in OECD (1979).
2. For a more detailed discussion of these problems, see Atkinson and
Chouraqui (1986, 1987).
3. For a review of country experiences in this respect, see BIS (1984) and 
Annual Reports.
4. The use of the exchange rate in the conduct of monetary policy is
examined in OECD (1985).
5. See Chouraqui, Driscoll and Strauss-Kahn (1988, 1989).
6. OECD (1975).
7. See, in this respect, OECD (1985) and Atkinson and Chouraqui (1985).
8. This has particularly been a problem in some countries where the assets 
included in monetary aggregates have been restricted to the liabilities 
of the monetary authorities and commercial banks, as with Ml and M2 in 
the United States before 1980, M2R in France and £M3 in the United 
Kingdom, making the significance of these aggregates vulnerable to 
disintermediation.
9. Support for Divisia aggregates using U.S. data is reported in Barnett
(1980, 1982), Barnett and Spindt (1979) and Barnett, Offenbacher and
Spindt (1981).
10. See, for example, the studies by Cockerline and Murray (1981) using 
Canadian data and Bailey, Driscoll et al . (1982) for the United Kingdom.
11. A more detailed discussion of the limitation of Divisia aggregates is 
contained in Goldfield (1982).
12. See, for example, Meade (1978) and Tobin (1983).
i
13. For more detailed discussion, see OECD (1985).
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